Property rights is newly emerging conceptintroduced in the world especially in developed nations to determine the valueof particular economic good or economic resource and its ownership such as pollution rights etc. Property rights aretheoretical socially enforced constructs in economics for determining how aresource or economic good is used and owned. Resources can be owned byindividuals, associations or governments.
Property rights in the world oceanare also one of those which are used to determine the value and ownership ofparticular ocean size but it’s very timely and complex process to do that. It’stimely because resources of ocean are in transition. It means these resourcesadopt different forms time to time.The process of transition occurs due to twomain reasons like economic pressure on the seas resources and because of suddeninterest in seas wealth by newly emerging nation states. The subject of oceanproperty rights has been discussed in different sessions by United Nationsconference on the law of the sea. In March and April 1975 a 3rd session was heldin Geneva. Property rights of the oceans are very complex in nature because ofnot only that of jurisdiction but also due to its wide variety of ocean resourcesand its uses.
Its uses require some agent and that agent may be an individualor group within a nation or nation itself. Due to all these complex issues itis impossible to deal in detail with all the problems related to the propertyrights in the world ocean. As ocean resources can be transfer from an agentcontrol to another agent but in meaningful sense property rights do not existin any meaningful sense.The satisfactory property rights means theresource are essentially treated as common property resources. These are itscharacteristics:· It is anatural resource whose flow of services has economic value.
· Theflow of services is treated as individual.· Theflow of services can be used by any individual economic unit within a group ofeconomic units.· Thereis no agent that controls access within the group of economic units to the flowof economic units.At international level for those resourcesfound beyond national control common property resources include fisheries, theminerals of the deep sea bed, the use of ocean space for maritime commerce inareas of congestion and the assimilating capacities of the oceans for wastedisposal.The condition of common property emerges fromthe principle of the freedom of the seas which guarantees free and open accessto all nations. At the national level treatment of a resource as commonproperty depends, in part, upon the choice of the government.
Fisheries, forexample, are generally treated as common property in the United States and WesternEurope, but are not common property in Japan, the Soviet Union, and the EasternBloc countries, where access is controlled. Other resources in the UnitedStates that are, or have been, treated as common property include common oilpools, the radio spectrum, air, bodies of water, recreational lands, and wildlife.As we discussed that there are two factors involved in the establishment andenforcement of control over ocean resources. These are economic desirability ofcreating satisfactory property rights and other is political pressures forredistributing the seas’ wealth. Discussing these factors, it is clear thatconsiderable economic wastes result from the present common property condition.It is not clear, however, whether the costs of acquiring and enforcing someform of satisfactory property rights are less than the benefits that can beachieved.
This is a particularly difficult calculationto make for many fishery resources, especially those that swim freely acrossman’s boundaries. It is less difficult for the minerals of the sea, but thereare basic problems that will require a great deal of effort to resolve. Different Calculations indicate that acquiring, and enforcement of jurisdiction isdesirable, the political pressures are such that attempts to acquire jurisdictioncan be considered unstoppable,at least for resources of the coastal margin. These all things have beendiscussed in Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, likepolitical pressures and which has delegates from almost every nation in theworld. The complexities of the issues, together withthe participation of such a large number of countries, make the outcomeunclear. The Conference could fall apart if impatience drives an increasing numberof countries to take unilateral actions.
It could fail if the majority reachesdecisions that are unacceptable to the powerful maritime states, such as theUnited States and the USSR. A maritime nation is any nationwhich borders the sea and is dependent on its use for majority of thefollowing state activities such as commerce and transport, war, todefine a territorial boundary, or for any maritime activity. It couldalso fail if the decisions reached are so general that they provideinsufficient guides for future management and distribution of the seas’ wealth.
But the outcome of the Conference will not affect the drive toward extended andenlarged authority of coastal nations over the ocean’s resources. Nor will theConference, even if successful, fully resolve the problems associated withexercise and enforcement of that authority. The transition from the principleof the freedom of the seas to establishment of effective property rights is anextremely difficult one, and steps currently being taken should only beconsidered the first steps resolving these complex issues of ocean propertyrights and its jurisdiction matters.Finally, the task of removing the conditionof common property for fisheries is very important including intra-nationaldimension that are mentioned briefly.If a country holds a specific Share of theyield from a stock of fish through the national quota approach or acquires theright to control foreign access.
so it gains the ability to remove the commonproperty condition for its own fishermen. He takes advantage or not of thatability depends upon a host of factors that cannot be considered fully here.This is challenging particularly within the United States, where many fisheriesare economically depressed and marked by overage vessels, inefficientregulations, and high management costs. Provision of some form of propertyrights through license limits, taxes, or fisherman quotas raises numerousquestions of an economic, political, and social nature. These questions needconsiderable attention in order to determine the desirability of accesscontrols and the best means of achieving them.