The Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill 2010 is also referred to as the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, the BP Oil Spill, the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, the BP Oil Disaster or the Macondo Blowout. The oil spill of the Gulf of Mexico started on April 20, 2010 with the explosion on the Transocean Deepwater Horizon Rig. “Deepwater Horizon” is a 5th generation, dynamic positioned (DP) semi-submersible oil rig owned by Transocean. The explosion has injured 17 platform workers and 11 are missing, presumably dead. The oil rig sank on April 22, 2010 which caused massive amount of oil to leak out into the Gulf of Mexico.
The spill occurred some 50 miles away from the cost of Venice, Louisiana. Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill of 2010 is considered the biggest offshore oil spill in US history as it crossed the mark of 10. 8 million gallons of oil spilled by the Exxon Valdez, previous largest oil spill in US. The source of the oil is a deepwater wellhead 5,000 feet or 1,500 meters below the ocean surface. Every day 210,000-260,000 gallons of crude oil has been wasted and added to the water of the Gulf of Mexico. This is equivalent of 1 Olympic pool every 3 days. Some scientists state that the rate is much higher than this.
Oil spill covers a total area of more than 4000 square miles which is 10 times larger than the area of New York City. But even a larger area is polluted by oil underwater, which cannot be seen from the surface. The Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill 2010 has greatly devastated the marine and wildlife habitats. This has put the population of turtles (Loggerhead, Kemp’s Ridley), mammals (Fin Whales, Sperm Whales, and Bottlenose Dolphin), fish (Tuna, Sailfish, Jack etc) and pelagic birds in that area in grave danger. These animals need to be protected. The initial loss for the fishing industry was 2. 73 billion USD.
US government has named BP as the responsible party for this disaster. The Deepwater Horizon was worth more than 560 million dollars. And the cost to clear up the huge mess on the water will be about $12. 5 billion. BP will pay the entire cost themselves. Unfortunately, for those of us who care about the environment, this statement covers only monetary costs. It is doubtful that there will be any attempts to replenish the ecosystems that will undoubtedly be crippled by the spill. Sure, animal rescues and cleanup will be underway, but what about the inevitable diminished population of creatures in the area?
Various organizations are currently working on keeping the oil as contained as possible. Methods in use include dispersants and skimmers. However, the oil is leaking under 5,000 feet of water. These methods may not prove to be as useful in this situation as they have been in others. At this point, all we can do is hope that a few competent people can stem this disaster before the Gulf of Mexico has yet another “dead zone. ” 2. Triggering the leak The fire aboard the Deepwater Horizon reportedly started at 9:56 p. m. CDT on April 20, 2010.
At the time, there were 126 crew on board: seven employees of BP, 79 of Transocean, as well as employees of various other companies involved in the operation of the rig, including Anadarko, Halliburton and M-I Swaco. According to Transocean executive Adrian Rose, abnormal pressure accumulated inside the marine riser and as it came up it “expanded rapidly and ignited”. According to interviews with platform workers conducted during BP’s internal investigation, a bubble of methane gas escaped from the well and shot up the drill column, expanding quickly as it burst through several seals and barriers before exploding.
Rose said the event was basically a blowout. Survivors described the incident as a sudden explosion which gave them less than five minutes to escape as the alarm went off. The explosion was followed by a fire that engulfed the platform. After burning for more than a day, Deepwater Horizon sank on April 22, 2010. The Coast Guard stated to CNN on April 22, 2010 that they received word of the sinking at approximately 10:21 am.
BP subsequently produced a report that suggests that the ignition source for the explosion and subsequent fire was as a result of the released hydrocarbons being ingested into the air intakes of the diesel generators, and engulfing the deck area where the exhaust outlets for the main generators were emitting hot exhaust gas. Had the engines been fitted with automatic combustion inlet shutdown valves, Pyroban kits, or executive gas detection systems that shutdown generator room HVAC systems automatically, the diesel engine ignition source could have been mitigated by breaking the fire triangle. . Media coverage The massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, which began with the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion on April 20 and continued to gush for another three months, posed a daunting set of challenges for the news media. Unlike most catastrophes, which tend to break quickly and subside almost as fast, the spill was a slow-motion disaster that demanded constant vigilance and sustained reporting. The story was also complex, dominated by three ontinuing and sometimes competing story lines from three different locales – the role of the London-based oil company, the efforts of the Obama administration and the events in the Gulf region – that taxed reportorial resources and journalistic attention spans. Coverage of the disaster also required a significant amount of technical and scientific expertise. News consumers were introduced to a series of new terms and concepts as the media tried to explain the efforts to contain the spill and formulate reliable estimates of the extent of the environmental and economic damage. pic] The news media, in short, found themselves with a complicated, technical and long-running disaster saga that did not break down along predictable political and ideological lines. And they were reporting to an American public that displayed a ravenous appetite for the spill story. How did the press handle the challenge? A new study of media coverage of the oil spill disaster by the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism finds that, given the tough task they faced, the media as a whole seemed to rise to the occasion.
News organizations displayed real staying power as events continued to unfold. They spent considerable time reporting from the Gulf and humanizing the crisis. They largely avoided the temptation to turn the disaster into a full-blown political-finger-pointing story. And in many cases they used their websites’ interactive features to illuminate aspects of the story that would have been harder to digest in print or broadcast formats. In short, a news industry coping with depleted staffing, decreasing revenues and shrinking ambition was tested by the oil spill and seemed to pass.
To evaluate that coverage, PEJ studied approximately 2,866 stories about the oil spill produced from April 20 to July 28 – from the day that the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded to the day after BP CEO Tony Hayward’s departure was announced. The study finds eight essential points about how the media covered the disaster: ? The oil spill was by far the dominant story in the mainstream news media in the 100-day period after the explosion, accounting for 22% of the newshole – almost double the next biggest story.
In the 14 full weeks included in this study, the disaster finished among the top three weekly stories 14 times. And it registered as the No. 1 story in nine of those weeks. ? The activities in the Gulf – the cleanup and containment efforts as well as the impact of the disaster – represented the leading storyline of the disaster, accounting for 47% of the overall coverage. Next came attention to the role of BP (27% of the coverage). The third-biggest storyline was Washington based – the response and actions of the Obama administration (17%). The Obama White House generated decidedly mixed media coverage for its role in the spill saga, but questions about its role diminished over time – in part thanks to a Republican misfire. And the administration fared considerably better than BP and its CEO Tony Hayward, who on balance were portrayed as the villains of the story. ? BP emerged as the antagonist in the media narrative about the oil spill, particularly its CEO Tony Hayward. But outside of two Louisiana politicians playing smaller roles, none of the top newsmakers were portrayed as protagonists in the saga. The Gulf saga was first and foremost a television story. It generated the most coverage in cable news (31% of the airtime studied), with CNN devoting considerably more attention (42% of its airtime) than cable rivals MSNBC and Fox News. The spill also accounted for 29% of the coverage on network news as the three big commercial broadcast networks – ABC, CBS and NBC – spent virtually the same amount of time on the story. ? The spill story generated considerably less attention in social media, on blogs, Twitter and YouTube. Among blogs, for example, it made the roster of top stories five times in 14 weeks.
But during those weeks one theme resonated – skepticism toward almost all the principals in the story. ? While some did better than others, many traditional media outlets made effective use of interactive features on their websites to track key aspects of the disaster. The PBS News Hour’s Oil Leak Widget, for example, monitored the amount of oil spilling into the Gulf. The New York Times website offered a video animation that helped explain how a last ditch effort to prevent the spill failed. ? If anything, public interest in the Gulf saga may have even exceeded the level of mainstream media coverage.
According to surveys by the Pew Research Center for the People ; the Press, often between 50% and 60% of Americans said they were following the story “very closely” during these 100 days. That surpassed the level of public interest during the most critical moments of the health care reform debate. 4. Corporate activity in terms of stopping the leak Short-term efforts The first attempts to stop the oil spill were to use remotely operated underwater vehicles to close the blowout preventer valves on the well head; however, all these attempts failed.
The second technique, placing a 125-tonne (280,000 lb) containment dome (which had worked on leaks in shallower water) over the largest leak and piping the oil to a storage vessel on the surface, failed when gas leaking from the pipe combined with cold water formed methane hydrate crystals that blocked the opening at the top of the dome. Attempts to close the well by pumping heavy drilling fluids into the blowout preventer to restrict the flow of oil before sealing it permanently with cement (“top kill”) also failed. More successful was the process of positioning a riser insertion tube into the wide burst pipe.
There was a stopper-like washer around the tube that plugs the end of the riser and diverts the flow into the insertion tube. The collected gas was flared and oil stored on the board of drillship Discoverer Enterprise. 924,000 US gallons (22,000 barrels) of oil were collected before removal of the tube. By June 3, BP removed the damaged riser from the top of the blowout preventer and covered the pipe by the cap which connected it to a riser. CEO of BP Tony Hayward stated that as a result of this process the amount captured was “probably the vast majority of the oil. However, the FRTG member Ira Leifer said that more oil was escaping than before the riser was cut and the cap containment system was placed. On June 16, a second containment system connected directly to the blowout preventer became operational carrying oil and gas to the Q4000 service vessel where it was burned in a clean-burning system. To increase the processing capacity, the drillship Discoverer Clear Leader and the floating production, storage and offloading (FPSO) vessel Helix Producer 1 were added, offloading oil with tankers Evi Knutsen, and Juanita.
Each tanker has capacity of 750,000 barrels (32,000,000 US gallons; 119,000 cubic metres). In addition, FPSO Seillean, and well testing vessel Toisa Pisces would process oil. They are offloaded by shuttle tanker Loch Rannoch. On July 5, BP announced that its one-day oil recovery effort accounted for about 25,000 barrels of oil, and the flaring off of 57. 1 million cubic feet (1. 62? 10^6 m3) of natural gas. The total oil collection to date for the spill was estimated at 660,000 barrels. The government’s estimates suggested the cap and other equipment were capturing less than half of the oil leaking from the sea floor as of late June.
On July 10, the containment cap was removed to replace it with a better-fitting cap consisting of a Flange Transition Spool and a 3 Ram Stack (“Top Hat Number 10”). On July 15 BP tested the well integrity by shutting off pipes that were funneling some of the oil to ships on the surface, so the full force of the gusher from the wellhead went up into the cap. That same day, BP said that the leak had been stopped after all the blowout preventer valves had been closed on the newly-fitted cap. Permanent closure
Transocean’s Development Driller III started drilling a first relief well on May 2 and was at 13,978 feet (4,260 m) out of 18,000 feet (5,500 m) as of June 14. GSF Development Driller II started drilling a second relief on May 16 and was halted at 8,576 feet (2,614 m) out of 18,000 feet (5,500 m) as of June 14 while BP engineers verified the operational status of the second relief well’s blowout preventer. Each relief well is expected to cost about $100 million. Starting at 15:00 CDT on August 3, first test oil and then drilling mud was pumped at a slow rate of approximately two barrels/minute into the well-head.
Pumping continued for eight hours, at the end of which time the well was declared to be “in a static condition. ” At 09:15 CDT on August 4, with Adm. Allen’s approval, BP began pumping cement from the top, sealing that part of the flow channel permanently. On August 4, Allen said the static kill was working. Two weeks later, though, Allen said it was uncertain when the well could be declared completely sealed. The bottom kill had yet to take place, and the relief well had been delayed by storms. Even when the relief well was ready, he said, BP had to make sure pressure would not build up again.
On August 19, Allen said that some scientists believe it is possible that a collapse of rock formations has kept the oil from continuing to flow and that the well might not be permanently sealed. The U. S. government wants the failed blowout preventer to be replaced in case of any pressure that occurs when the relief well intersects with the well. On September 3 at 1:20 p. m. CDT the 300 ton failed blowout preventer was removed from the well and began being slowly lifted to the surface. Later that day a replacement blowout preventer was placed on the well.
On September 4 at 6:54 p. m. CDT the failed blowout preventer reached the surface of the water and at 9:16 p. m. CDT it was placed in a special container on board the vessel Helix Q4000. The failed blowout preventer will be taken to a NASA facility in Louisiana for examination. On September 10, Allen said the bottom kill could start sooner than expected because a “locking sleeve” could be used on top of the well to prevent excessive pressure from causing problems. BP said the relief well was about 50 feet from the intersection, and finishing the boring would take four more days.
On September 16, the relief well reached its destination and pumping of cement to seal the well began. On September 19, 2010, BP effectively killed the Macondo Well five months after the April 20th explosion. The relief well being drilled intersected the blown-out well Thursday September 16, and crews started pumping in cement on Friday September 17 to permanently plug it. Retired Coast Guard Adm. Thad Allen said, BP’s well was “effectively dead. ” Allen said a pressure test to ensure the cement plug would hold was completed at 5:54 a. m. CDT.
He added, “Additional regulatory steps will be undertaken but we can now state definitively that the Macondo Well poses no continuing threat to the Gulf of Mexico”. 5. Corporate activity in terms of reducing the harm and damage compensation • Prevention ? Branch Office Structure The evolution of the Branch Office Structure exemplifies the concept that “oil spill response is local. ” Across the GulfCoast, 19 branch offices were created to greatly expand coordination and planning capability, increase responsiveness, engage local knowledge, increase deployment accuracy, and serve as hub for community outreach.
Once established, the branch offices across the Gulf Coast drove all of the near-shore and on-shore response activities and often effectively engaged local stakeholders in the response. ? Open-Water Skimming While skimming oil from water had been tried and tested through other responses, the scale and duration of this response, along with the frequently dynamic and variable nature of oil characteristics, proved a new challenge for skimming. This challenge drove significant improvements to skimming equipment, along with new approaches to organization, maintenance, and deployment of skimmers ? Controlled In-Situ Burning
Through this response, controlled in-situ burning has undergone a step change from a conceptually tested approach to a proven and mission-critical method for removing oil from open-water. Techniques, understanding of burn criteria, preservation of specialized fireboom, and the base of experts have all been significantly augmented through the experiences gained in this response. ? Aerial Dispersants The application of dispersants under the direction of Unified Command at the subsea source and in the open water may have been the most effective and fastest-mobilized tool for minimizing shoreline impact.
Multidisciplinary global expertise was mobilized to drive success in a very complex operation. ? Booming The Deepwater Horizon response has included the largest deployment of boom in the history of spill response – to date, the response has mobilized more than 14 million feet and deployed approximately 4. 2 million feet of containment boom and approximately 9. 1 million feet of sorbent boom. While booming is one of the most high-profile methods for protecting shorelines, its application is often misunderstood.
Booming can be effective when applied through well-established and tested strategies that: • Account for current, wind, sea state and shoreline type; • Acknowledge that natural forces will significantly detract from the effectiveness of boom; and • Reflect the fact that in many situations, other tactics can provide better protection of the shoreline. • Clean-Up ? Marsh Cleaning The marsh cleaning operation is systematically deploying trained teams across the Gulf Coast employing a best-practice, “small-scale” approach on a larger scale.
The response to marsh cleaning has been carefully managed by Unified Command (including NOAA) and will continue. ? Beach Cleaning The response team has directed extensive resources toward keeping oil off the beaches, and, where oil has appeared, toward rapidly and effectively cleaning them. To minimize intrusion, the response has emphasized close cooperation with the most affected communities. • Compensation and recovery BP has agreed to put $US20 billion ($23. 1 billion) into a fund to help pay compensation claims from the Gulf of Mexico oil spill after a deal was struck at the White House.
After a four-hour meeting with BP’s senior executives US president Barack Obama announced the British company will set up the compensation fund that will be independently run. The fund is not capped and it does not include BP’s costs for repairing the environmental damage done by the oil spill. Nor does it include the fines and penalties BP may eventually have to pay. The $US20 billion fund will be financed through BP cutting three-quarters of its dividends, significantly reducing its investment program and selling $US10 billion of assets. The commitments are harsher penalties than most investors had expected.
Investors had expected the suspension of BP’s dividend, or payment in shares for a couple of quarters but had not expected BP to be forced to sell assets and cut investment – moves that will curb BP’s growth going forward. BP has also agreed to set up a $US100 million ($115 million) fund for unemployed oil workers affected by the fallout from the Gulf of Mexico spill. 6. Long term issues • Families Of The Fallen Amid the frenzy of attention over the disaster, the media seems to be giving the smallest mention to those 11 men who tragically lost their lives from this awful accident.
They traveled from Louisiana, Mississippi, and even Texas to work hard and provide for their families. Unfortunately, these families now have to suffer the unimaginable sadness of having lost their loved ones. • Environmental Damage 21 years after the Exxon Valdez disaster it is estimated that 21,000 gallons of oil still remain just below the surface of Alaska’s Prince William Sound, and the long term environmental effects on the area have far exceeded scientists’ original predictions.
It can be hard to gauge the extent of the current disaster in the Gulf, as the oil continues to flow relentlessly into the water, and the sandy beaches and coastal marshes will certainly react differently to the pollution than Alaska’s rocky terrain. Regardless, it is clear that the damage will be dire. Many species are currently nesting and reproducing in the area, and an entire generation of hundreds of species could be lost as a result. Countless marine birds could also be affected, as the area is a primary flyway for many species, currently in its peak migratory period.
Though the cause is still unknown, the numerous dead sea turtles and other creatures that have washed ashore is perhaps an early ominous sign of the marine crisis the oil is causing in the deeper waters offshore. New information also reveals that BP is using 100,000 gallons of dispersants (1/3 of the world’s supply) on the oil, further contaminating the ocean with harmful chemicals. Unfortunately, the true environmental ramifications of this catastrophe won’t be known for years to come • Human Health The health of countless people are at risk as oil spreads further along the coast, affecting more communities.
Oil can turn into a heavy vapor that can then be inhaled by humans in the surrounding areas. The volatile chemicals in oil can cause minor immediate health problems, but have been linked to cancer over longer periods of time. In addition, these chemicals have been associated with miscarriage and can damage airways, so pregnant women and people with respiratory diseases are especially at risk. Oil is also damaging to skin, and the chemicals can be absorbed from this contact, meaning that the numerous local fisherman BP has hired to aid in clean-up efforts are at risk on many levels.
In addition, as tragically seen from the Exxon Valdez disaster, local people can suffer long term personal damage from the devastation of their communities, with the escalated stress on families leading to increases in alcoholism, suicide, violence, and divorce. • Seafood Industry Federal officials have shut down all fishing between the Mississippi River and Florida Panhandle until early-mid next week at the soonest. Fisheries in Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida are threatened from the effects of this disaster. Louisiana’s $2. billion sea food industry accounts for approximately 1/3 of the shrimp, oysters, crab and craw fish in America. While the temporary fishing ban only halts 1/4 of Louisiana’s seafood production, this could easily change if the oil begins to spread west. But the real impact on the seafood industry will be the long term consequences. The unknown extent of this catastrophe could have an adverse impact on the reproduction of seafood species as well the microscopic creatures that they feed on, potentially devastating the seafood operations in the area for years to come.
The spill may even affect bluefin tuna stocks off Atlantic Canada—a species already intensely in decline—as they travel to the Gulf to spawn. • Tourism The Gulf Coast has long been home to pristine beaches, admired for their purity and cleanliness. Countless resorts and thriving tourist economies flourish from this natural beauty, with tourism pulling in $100 billion a year in the region. Unfortunately, the oil spill perilously threatens this vital industry with the potential to paint stretches of unspoiled beach black. • Financial Cost
BP is currently spending $6 million a day in attempts to contain the oil spill. Their stock market value has already dropped approximately $32 billion in the aftermath. Exxon spent over $4 billion after the mess it made in 1989, but BP’s disaster is projected to eclipse that event in size and cost. One market analyst predicts that BP could face anywhere from $5 billion to $15 billion in the end for cleanup, damage claims and lawsuits. BP will also suffer long term damage to their reputation, as they have been considered the oil company with the most “environmentally friendly” image.
Despite other issues in the past that BP has been responsible for, none have had the magnitude or received as much attention as the Gulf spill. • Climate Bill Legislation attempting to address the effects of climate change has been a long time coming. The bill, which aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 17% lower than 2005 by 2020, also includes provisions to expand domestic production of oil, natural gas, and nuclear power. Obama’s recent announcement to expand offshore drilling was primarily seen by many as a move to gain more support for the bill from those who had opposed it.
A lot of environmentalists conceded the compromise as necessary, understanding the greater good it would have getting the legislation through. In the wake of this offshore oil disaster, hope for the bill is looking bleaker than ever, with numerous lawmakers refusing to lend any support if offshore drilling measures are incorporated. The environmental crisis currently on our hands only further emphasizes the need for legislation that will truly protect our environment and lead to a clean energy America. 7. Lessons Learned • Lesson 1: Collaboration
A broad range of stakeholders has come together in the wake of Deepwater Horizon to provide effective solutions and build new capabilities. At its peak, this collaboration brought together: • More than 47,800 responders; • Dozens of federal, state and local agencies; • Eight exploration and production operators; • Hundreds of industry suppliers; • More than 6,000 marine vessels, including approximately 5,800 VOOs; • Six deepwater drilling vessels; • Two FPSOs; • 150 aircraft; and • Partners and governments from no fewer than 19 countries… …all working through five ICPs and 19 Branch Offices Lesson 2: Systemization The response has required the development of extensive systems, procedures and organizational capabilities to adapt to changing and unique conditions. As the Deepwater Horizon spill continued despite efforts at the wellhead, the response effort also progressed, expanded, and took on not just new tasks and directions but new personnel and resources. As a result, from source to shore, existing systems were evolved and expanded and new ones developed to advance work flow, improve coordination, focus efforts and manage risks.
The value of these systems was underscored by the ability of a large containment team to operate efficiently in close quarters, to coordinate on an ongoing basis from an offshore base, and ultimately to succeed in containing and capping the well. • Lesson 3: Information Timely, reliable information has been essential across both the containment and response operations to achieve better decision-making, ensure safe operations and inform stakeholders and the public.
Reliable information is indispensable in managing any crisis but especially amid the far-reaching challenges, relentless pressures and often hazardous conditions confronting spill response. The Deepwater Horizon responders were able to take advantage of cutting-edge tools to manage information-sharing inside Unified Command and externally, to improve decision-making and to coordinate complex activities across response and containment, such as simultaneous operations. • Lesson 4: Innovation The urgency in containing the spill and dealing with its effects has driven innovation in technology, tools, equipment, processes and know-how.
The concentration of talent, compressed timeframes for effective solutions, and the need to achieve results quickly at scale without compromising standards for safety and risk management made the Deepwater Horizon response a natural laboratory for innovation both in technology and systems. The result has been a series of developments, ranging from incremental enhancements to step changes in technologies and techniques, that have advanced the state of the art and laid the foundation for future refinements as part of an enhanced regime for any type of source-to-shore response.
As laid out in more detail in the previous two sections, these innovations cover areas including: Innovations in Equipment: • Open and closed containment • Subsea dispersant injection • Subsea hydraulic distribution and Tools for ROVs • Surveillance communications and data management • Hydrate mitigation • Skimmer technology • Acoustic telemetry • Boom technology • Information technology • Controlled in-situ burning technology • Multipurpose vessels • Beach-cleaning technology • Ranging technologies • Marsh-cleaning technology • FPSOs and riser systems
Innovations in systems, process and procedure: • System integration tests • Diagnostics and measurement • Diagnostic pressure measurements • Dynamic positioning • Removal of damaged risers • Containment disposition • Closed system construction • Emergency disconnect/hurricane evacuation • Redundant systems • Dispersant management and testing • 4D planning • Supply chain management • Storyboarding • Controlled in-situ burning • Marine SIMOPS • Skimming • Visualization tools for marine ops • Boomin 8. Management recommendations • Strict control of the work
It’s essential that after the accident with the oil spill in the mexican gulf our company should make a strict revision of all its assets and working machines. The example with the disaster shows that if for instance 1 million dollars were invested in investigating the platform and the pomp, those 12 billion spending for cleaning the gulf and compensating the injured people and territories, would have been saved and used for different investments. A team of highly prepared professionals could be gathered in order to make occasional, deep examinations of all the working areas of the company.
An annual salary of a highly prepared supervisor can be estimated approximately to 5 million dollars. A team of 10 such professionals would cost the company 5 million dollars. However, if working properly and effectively, such department would save billions of dollars from prevented accidents. • Action plan for immediate response in the case of accidents As petroleum industry is connected with many risks, it is essential that the company would prepare a detailed plan with actions in case an accident occurs.
Such plan should consist of different scenarios, connected with the possible future situations and their evolution. It is necessary to gather a team of experts with proper knowledge and experience in the field of petroleum industry. Hundreds of well-know scientists from all around the globe were involved with the dealing with the Mexican gulf oil spill. It would be reasonable decision to hire some of those experts as they already have gained the required knowledge and experience. • Detailed analysis of the BP oil spill in the Mexican gulf
Every unexpected situation is a consequence of a number of prior wrong decisions and actions. In order this mistakes not to be repeated again it is essential that a detailed analysis of the BP oil spill disaster should be prepared. Of course some other related situations should be deeply analyzed, as every unexpected event has its own nature and consequences. The current analysis is an example of what the work should contain as main points. • Opening a fund for special purposes – unexpected events, disasters, compensations
A good lesson can be taken from the Macondo disaster, considering the company’s policy according to the unexpected events and risk management. Because of the oil spill and the consequences from it, BP was forced to sell some of its assets and cut the dividends of the shareholders. If the company has collected for example 5 % of its annual income and has put it into a special fund like the proposed one, this kind of measures would have been superfluous. For example, some recent statistics shows that the annual gross profit of BP for the last three years is as follows: Period Ending |Dec 31, 2009 |Dec 31, 2008 |Dec 31, 2007 | |Total Revenue |239,272,000 |367,053,000 |284,365,000 | |Cost of Revenue |190,726,000 |303,573,000 |200,766,000 | | | |Gross Profit |48,546,000 |63,480,000 |83,599,000 | % of the profit equals to 9,781,250 US dollars. As we take into consideration that BP has more than a hundred years of history, we can imagine how much money would have been in the fund if it was established from the beginning. Therefore, in my opinion such fund should be open. • Media campaign – stable social image This point may stay as a result of all the previous recommendations. Each of them is connected with environmental conservation, stability of the work of the company and effectiveness in the use of the annual income.
Such directions could secure every company’s positive image among the nation and the world. It is useful that the PR department uses different press releases and other methods and sources to inform the society for the company’s work and its positive impacts on the business and nature. After being witnesses to the Macondo disaster, it is important for everyone to notice changes in the politics and restrictions according to the petroleum business. • SWOT analysis By making a deep and careful SWOT analysis, managers can find out what are the strengths and weaknesses, and also the opportunities and threads.
On this basis, they can make their future plans by improving their weaknesses and preserving their strength. According to what the opportunities and threads are, they can easily develop strategies for the implementation of the plans. • Investments in R&D It is maybe one of the most important issues for a company, dealing with petrol. The company should give as much as it can afford in order to develop old and discover new practices, techniques, equipments and products. Some recent researches show that companies with highly developed R&D departments are enjoying much more popularity and profit gains.
As it concerns business with high percentage of risk, R&D departments take even the roll of security providers, inventors of safer technologies and machines. • Improving safety policy It is a very important issue, aiming to avoid or at least diminish death or injury in case of such an accident. Each company, especially those, whose activity is connected to oil extraction, should have a strict safety policy in order to react in a proper way in hard situations. Life loss can be very dangerous for one company. It is not only crucial for the reputation, but is also connected to explanations, examinations and also huge compensations. Training up experts Training experts to deal with offshore oil spills would be very useful for coping with matters of urgencies. Sending them on field trips, trainings, seminars, or exchange programmes is a good way to make them better prepared. Managers should ensure access to the latest literature for technology development and scientific matters, connected to the area of this business. • Acquiring proper equipment Companies should always be prepared for unexpected situations with the right equipment. Depending on the activity of the company, it can either manufacture it, or import it from abroad.
Managers should allocate enough funds for equipment and machinery and it is of vital importance to ensure everything they need from safe extracting to natural preservation. • Replacing some of the available equipment If experts find a defect in a part of the equipment, it should be replaced immediately. It applies to everything- machines, feed engines,diferent components etc. It is not obligatory to be broken, I order to be fixed ot replaced. If it is depreciated or outadted, it is better for the managers to take action.
It is sometimes better to allot more money for not so urgent issues, than to wait for a problem to happen. Sometimes present ivestments lead to future savings. • Employing additional or new personnel It is a good idea in case managers feel that the personnel do not keep their duties, or they just need more experienced people. It is a double-edged sword, because sometimes it is not the best decision. It can take a lot of time for new workers to integrate themselves, to learn how the company works and to be aware with the policy.
They should pass through training and it can be wheter expensive, or time-consuming. On the other hand, sometimes there are experienced people on the labour market who can contribute to the development of the organization. Sometimes the company should use head-hunters to find the proper personnel.
Sources: Containment and Response: • “Deepwater Horizon Containment and Response: Harnessing Capabilities and Lessons Learned • Deepwater Horizon oil spill, http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spil Gulf of Mexico Oil Leak Facts, Published May 04, 2010 by Shelly Barclay, http://www. ssociatedcontent. com/article/2969118/2010_bp_gulf_of_mexico_oil_leak_facts_pg2. html? cat=9 How the Media Covered the Gulf Oil Spill Disasted, August 25, 2010, http://pewresearch. org/pubs/1707/media-coverage-analysis-gulf-oil-spill-disaster • Methods That Have Been Tried to Stop the Leaking Oil, August 17, 2010 http://www. nytimes. com/interactive/2010/05/25/us/20100525-topkill-diagram. html • 7 Long-Term Effects Of The Gulf Oil Spill, http://www. huffingtonpost. com/2010/05/10/7-long-term-effects-of-th_n_562947. html#s87711
The federal government has finally declared the Macondo well dead after nearly five months of failed attempts and semi-successes by BP engineers to permanently plug the leaking well in the Gulf of Mexico. The Bottom Kill The federal government has finally declared the Macondo well dead after nearly five months of failed attempts and semi-successes by BP engineers to permanently plug the leaking well in the Gulf of Mexico. The Bottom Kill The federal government has finally declared the Macondo well dead after nearly five months of failed attempts and semi-successes by BP engineers to